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TAXATION FEDERAL INCOME TAX INTANGIBLE SATISFACTION
FROM GIFT As INCOME TO THE DoNOR - Respondent, the owner of negotiable
bonds, detached from them negotiable interest coupons shortly before their due
date and delivered them as a gift to his son, who in the same year collected them
at maturity. The commissioner of internal revenue ruled that the interest payments were taxable to the respondent donor.1 The circuit court of appeals reversed the order of the board of tax appeals sustaining the tax. 2 Held, the commissioner was correct in including such interest payments in the taxable income
of the donor. Helvering v. Horst, (U.S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. 144.
Respondent, a general life insurance agent, after the termination of his
agency, made assignments in 1924 and I 928 respectively of renewal commissions to become payable to him for services which had been rendered in writing
policies of insurance under two of his agency contracts. The commissioner of
internal revenue assessed the renewal commissions paid by the companies to the
assignees in 1933 as income taxable to the assignor in that year. 8 The circuit

1 The statute applied was the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 686 (1934),
26 U. S. C. (1934), § 22.
2 Horst v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 107 F. (2d) 906, reversing 39
B. T. A. 757 (1939).
8 The statute applied was the Revenue Act of 1932, +7 Stat. L. 178, § 22 (1932),
the provisions of which do not differ in any respect material to the instant case from the
Revenue Act of 1934, § 22.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

court of appeals again reversed the board's decision in favor of the commissioner.4
Held, the commissioner was correct in including such payments in the taxable
income of the assignor. Justice McReynolds' dissent in both cases was concurred
in by Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Roberts. Helvering v. Eubank, (U. S.
1940) 61 S. Ct. 149.
In the gradual development of the income tax law the taxpayer has been
generally unsuccessful in securing for himself the benefits of income without the
companion burden of taxation. 5 Employers seeking to make "gifts" to. their employees in the way of a bonus or by payment of income taxes assessed against
their employees have failed to convince the courts that these payments were
anything but· compensation for services rendered and taxable to the employee as income. 6 Income from revocable trusts has been held constitutionally
taxable to the settlor even though the money is actually paid to the beneficiary.1
Even the income from irrevocable trusts is now taxable to the settlor when he has
retained the "substance of enjoyment," 8 or where he enjoys the benefit of the
income through the liquidation of a legal obligation,9 or where there is a family
4 Eubank v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 2d, 1934) I IO F. (2d) 737, reversing 39
B. T. A. 583 (1939).
5 Buck, "Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance: The Deflection of Income," 23
VA. L. REv. 107 (1936), 265 (1937).
6 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 49 S. Ct. 499 (1929).
1
Here the employer paid the income taxes assessed against the employee. Noel v. Parrott,
(C. C. A. 4th, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 669, cert. den. 273 U.S. 754, 47 S. Ct. 4.57 (1927).
A bonus is taxable income and not a gift to the employee. United States v. Boston &
M. R. R., 279 U. S. 732, 49 S. Ct. 505 (1929). Payment by lessee of net income
taxes assessable against lessor constitutes additional income to the lessor. Also see Blair
v. Rosseter, (C. C. A. 9th, 1929) 33 F. (2d) 286. But insurance premiums paid by
the employer on policies covering the lives of the employees are specifically exempted
by Treas. Reg. 103, § 19.22 (a)-3 (1939).
7 Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 50 S. Ct. 336 (1929). The Court in this case
emphasized the control or power that the granter retained over the trust. Revocable
trusts are specifically taxable to the granter under Revenue Act of 1939, 53 Stat. L. 68,
§ 166 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. (1940), § 166. Reinecke v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172,
53 S. Ct. 570 (1933). Where the power to revoke the trust had been reserved to the
granter in conjunction with someone else, the income was still taxable to the granter.
8 Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 at 677, 53 S. Ct. 761 (1931), noted in
47 HARV. L. REV. 137 (1933).
9 Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U. S. 404, 60 S. Ct. 952 (1940); Douglas v.
Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 59 (1935). Income from trust here applied to payment of alimony. Likewise in Helvering v. Fitch, 309 U. S. 149, 60 S. Ct. 427
(1940). But see Helvering v. Fuller, 310 U.S. 69, 60 S. Ct. 784 (1940), where the
Court held that the. income from the trust was not taxable to the settler because under
the Nevada divorce decree the husband's obligation to support his wife was discharged.
Payments under a separation agreement, however, continued 'to be taxable to the
husband, since that was a continuing personal obligation. On the question of taxability
of income of alimony trust to husband-settler, see comment in 38 MxcH. L. REv.
1285 (1940); Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U. S. 551, 56 S. Ct. 304 (1935), per
curiam opinion reversing Schweitzer v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) 75 F.
(2d) 702, on authority of Douglas v. Willcuts, supra. This was a trust set up for the
support of the settler's children.
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trust for a short term. 10 Attempts to divert income by assignment of compensation before it reaches the taxpayer have likewise been unavailing on the ground
that "the tax could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements." 11 In the
principal cases the Court has further extended the concept of income taxable to
the donor. Negotiable interest coupons are by their very nature transferable and
subject to ownership independent of and separated from the bonds to which they
were originally attached. 12 Although the Court might properly have based its
decision on the narrow ground that this was an "anticipatory arrangement" 18
designed for the purpose of sapping the taxing statute of its vitality, it chose to
find the coupon payments taxable to the donor on the theory that he actually
en joyed a "realization" of income. 14 This realization of income came in the
form of a "satisfaction" which can be obtained only by the expenditure of money
or property.15 It is one of "such non-material satisfactions as may result from the

10 Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S. Ct. 554 (1940). Justice Douglas
emphasized (1) the short term of trust (3 years), (2) that the settlor was the trustee,
(3) that the beneficiary was the settlor's wife. Commented on in 38 M1cH. L. REv.
8 8 5 ( 1940). Where the beneficiary for life of a trust assigned an interest in it irrevocably, the opposite result was reached. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5, 57
S. Ct. 330 (1937). These cases are reconciled in a well reasoned opinion by District
Judge Lindley in Schaffner v. Harrison, (C. C. A. 7th, 1940) 113 F. (2d) 449.
11 Lucasv. Earl, 281 U.S. III at II5, 50S. Ct. 241 (1930). Here the husband
and wife agreed that any property which they received would be taken as joint tenants,
hence the husband actually only beneficially received half of his salary. Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 52 S. Ct. 345 (1932). See Rosenwald v. Commissioner, (C. C.
A. 7th, 1929) 33 F. (2d) 423, cert. denied 280 U.S. 599, 50 S. Ct. 69 (1929),
where the Court held that an assignment of future dividends did not relieve the
assignor from including them in his taxable income, on the theory that the gift was
not complete,since the dividends were not in esse at the time the assignment was made.
See Buck, "Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance: The Deflection of Income," 23 VA.
L. REV. 107 at I 30 ( I 936) for a discussion on "Assignments and Reservations of
Dividends on Corporate Stock" in the light of Lucas v. Earl and Burnet v. Leininger.
12 6 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed.,§§ 2734, 2738 (1931).
Coupons are written contracts for the payment of a definite sum of money on a given
day. 40 ALBANY L. J. 344 (1889). Since.ownership of the bonds is not a prerequisite
to receipt of the interest, and the assignee's rights do not depend on the assignor's
retention of the bonds, it was thought that there was no basis for finding coupon payments to the donee included in the donor's taxable income. Buck, "Income Tax Evasion
and Avoidance: The Deflection of Income," 23 VA. L. REv. 107 at 134 (1936);
43 HARV. L. REv. 1282 at 1284 (1930).
18 Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. III, 50 S. Ct. 241 (1930), noted in 43 HARV.
L. REv. 1282 (1930); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 52 S. Ct. 345 (1932).
B Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 53 S. Ct. 761 (1933). Here the application
of income to the insurance policies of certain kinfolk who may or may not have been
dependents was upheld. The taxpayer had no beneficial interest in the trust but it
meant a secure and satisfying relief from the commonly felt social and moral duty to
provide for dependents. See discussion of this case in 47 HARV. L. REv. I 209 at 1277
(1934).
15 Helvering v. Horst, (U. S. 1940) 61 S. Ct. 144 at 147: "Even though he
never receives the money he derives money's worth from the disposition of the coupons
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payment of a campaign or community chest contribution or a gift to [a]
favorite son." 16 While the result in the instant case may be justified as closing
up another avenue of tax evasion,17 it seems extraordinary that the "joy of giving" should be considered as income to the donor to be measured by the value of
the gift. 18
Walter B. Connolly

which he has used as money or money's worth in the procuring of a satisfaction which
is procurable only by the expenditure of money or money's worth."
16 Id. at 147. The Court continued: "To say that one who has made a gift thus
derived from interest or earnings paid to his donee has never enjoyed or realized the
fruits of his investment or labor because he has assigned them instead of collecting them
himself and then paying them over to the donee, is to affront common understanding
and to deny the facts of common experience."
l'i' Lucas v. Earl, 28 l U. S. l l 1, 50 S. Ct. Ct. 241 ( 1930); Burnet v. Leininger,
285 U. S. 136, 52 S. Ct. 345 (1932); Buck, "Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance:
The Deflection of Income," 23 VA. L. R&v. 107 (1936), 265 _(1937).
18 See dissent of Justice Sutherland, concurred in by Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Butler in .Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 at 683-684, 53 S. Ct. 761
(1933), where he stated: "If the trusts in question had irrevocably devoted the income
to charitable purposes, to the cause of scientific research, or to the promotion of the
spread of religion among the heathen, and the statute had authorized its taxation,
probably no thoughtful person would have insisted that the relation of the settler to the
benefaction was such as constitutionally to justify the tax against him. And yet in each
of these supposed cases it would not be hard to find a purpose to discharge a social
duty, or unreasonable to assume the desire of the settler thereby to enjoy the mental
comfort which is supposed to follow the voluntary performance of righteous deeds."

